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Abstract 
We report the results of voluntary contributions experiments where subjects are ran­
domly assigned constant marginal rates of substitution between the public and the private 
good .  These random assignments a.re changed after each decision period. The design al­
lows us to measure the response functions of the players in much the same way that 
bidding functions can be measured in private good, sealed-bid auction experiments .  The 
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ANOMALOUS BEHAVIOR IN LINEAR PUBLIC GOODS
EXPERIMENTS:
How MucH AND WHY?*
Thomas R. Palfrey Jeffrey E. Prisbrey 
1 Introduction
There is a growing body of data obtained from experiments on voluntary contributions 
in linear public goods environments with a single public good and a single private good .  
Many features of the data have been difficult to  explain; for  example, subjects violate 
dominant strategies on a regular basis .  They give away money, apparently just to be nice 
(Isaac and ·walker [1984, and elsewhere] ) ;  at least as often, they seem to give away money 
just to be mean (Saijo and Yamaguchi [1992] ) .  Furthermore, individual behavior over 
time exhibits erratic patterns, it alternates back and forth between extreme generosity 
and extreme selfishness . Ledyard's (1992) excellent survey documents these and several 
other anomalies . 
These anomalies might be cause for alarm as they signal trouble for any but the most 
schizophrenic models of behavior. However, the range of enviornments for which these 
experimental results have been reported is very narrow, and the designs employed make 
it difficult if not impossible to identify decision rules a.t an individual level. The point 
of this paper is to broaden the playing field in a natural direction, using a design that 
permits estimation of individual behavior. By changing both the information structure 
and the distribution of preferences, this design also provides a robustness check on the 
anomalous findings of pa.st experiments. 
\�Te offer the following thought experiment in the context of a well-studied private 
goods allocation mechanism, the second-price auction, in hopes that it will help the 
reader understand some of our concerns about design, and to foreshadow what follows. 
*The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Y.le thank
John Ledyard for his comments on an earlier draft, and :Mark Isaac and Jimmy Walker for sharing their 
data and for offering many helpful suggestions and comments. 
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A Thought Experiment: 
Imagine conducting a second-price sealed bid auction experiment with four 
players, where each is told to bid for an object that is worth exactly $1.58 to 
him.  After careful explanation of the rules, ten identical, sealed bid, second­
price auctions are then conducted in sequence. Bids are required to be greater 
than or equal to 0 and less than $1.58 and ties are broken randomly. After 
each auction, subjects are told the winning bid and the second highest bid .  
·when the tenth auction is over, everyone is paid by the experimenter and
thanked for showing up . 
\iVhat do you think the distribution of bids will be, and how will this distri­
bution change from period to period? How would you plan to bid in such an 
auction? 
The first observation to be made a.bout the thought experiment is that it shares some 
of the traits of many voluntary contribution, public goods experiments that have been 
reported in the literature. In the most common voluntary contribution, public goods 
experiment, like in the thought experiment, there are a. number of identical players. 
Also, the players are asked to make a. decision about buying a good and they a.re given 
personal incentives not to buy it, or at least to spend as little as possible on it .  Much of 
what is known a.bout free riding is based on experiments with this type of design. 
The second observation to be ma.de is that little can be learned about the general 
bidding behavior of the participants. In the auction, each player attaches the same value 
to the good in each of the ten auctions. Furthermore, every other player also attaches 
this same value to the good. The measurement of a general bidding function is practically 
impossible; the best one can do is estimate behavior at a particular point. 
It would be possible, by running a number of experiments and varying the value of 
the good, to construct something that looked like a bidding function. However, that 
function would depend upon the fa.ct that every player attaches the same value to the 
auctioned good.  This function would only measure how an individual's choice behavior 
changes when their own value and the joint distribution of all bidders' values change 
simultaneously. The estimated function would have other limitations as well-to obtain 
the data. required, an individual would have to participate in a large number of 10-a.uction 
sequences. The amount of play necessary might lea.cl to a. confounding of the effects of 
bidding behavior and of experience, unless a. large number of experiments were conducted. 
A final observation is that, in spite of the fa.ct that there is a. dominant strategy 
equilibrium where each bids $1.57, one can, for a variety of reasons, imagine players 
bidding differently. In fa.ct, it is difficult to guess what might actually happen, especially 
if the players a.re inexperiencecl .1 
10ne might also notice that the thought experiment is a repeated game not a one-shot game. We do 
not address this potential complication until later in the paper. 
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It should be no surprise to learn that auction experiments are not usually conducted 
like the thought experiment . Auction experiments have focused exclusively on different 
environments ,  environments in which pla.yers have diverse preferences and diverse infor­
mation. These are the environments in which auctions most naturally occur. What is 
surprising is that voluntary contribution experiments have, for the most part ,  not shared 
this focus. 2 
This paper, and the experimental design it employs, is motivated by our reflections 
about the thought experiment , and by a view that much can be gained by shifting the 
research agenda in the direction of this different class of environments. One benefit 
is simply better measurement: response (bidding) functions can be estimated at the 
individual level. Also, we can check for the robustness of existing results to environments 
that include features, such as heterogeneity of preferences, that are endemic to natural 
settings . In what follows, we report results from our experiments that study this kind of 
environment , and we contrast these results with previous findings. 
2 Background
This paper investigates contribution behavior under the Voluntary Contribution Mecha­
nism in simple linear public good environments where all players have dominant strate­
gies . The typical environment consists of N individuals, each endowed with Xi discrete
units of a private good. The marginal rate of transformation between the public good ,  
y ,  and the private good is one-for-one, and individual utility functions are of the form: 
U(y , xi)= Vy + TiXi· We refer to 11 as the value of the public good, and it i s  normalized
to be the same for all individuals . 
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism defines a simple game, in which each individ­
ual simultaneously decides how much public good (between 0 and Xi) to produce on his
own. Total public good production in the economy is the sum of all private production 
of the public good. Payoff functions are then defined from the final allocation and the 
utility functions in the obvious way. This game is repeated several times. 
As pointed out in Section 1 ,  much of what we think we know about behavior in this
game is based on experiments in which Xi and Ti are the same across individuals and
repetitions and ri/11 > 1. This paper concentrates on a group size of four.
2There are a few exceptions, notably Fisher et al. 1991 and Isaac et al. 1985, both of which 
consider environments with two types. The former provides subjects with identical information about 
other subjects' preferences as in parallel homogeneous preference experiments. The latter has several 
other different features, including nonlinearities, and does not conduct any baseline experiments with 
homogeneous preference. Brookshire et al. (1991), Smith (1980), and Marwell and Ames (1980) also have 
conducted experiments with heterogeneous preferences, but these are not comparable for other reasons. 
None of these experiments varied individual suhject preferences across decisions, nor did they provide 
explicit information about the distribution of preferences in the population. Palfrey and Rosenthal 
(1991) use an environment similar to the one explaned here, but the public good technology is step-level, 
not linear. 
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Several findings have emerged from these other investigations: (1) nearly all players 
in this game violate their one-shot dominant strategy, with many contributing upwards 
of half their endowment , even when ri/V is three or more; (2) there is a strong negative 
relationship between the marginal rate of substitution ri/V and the rate at which viola­
tions are observed; (3) roughly half the aggregate private endowment is contributed by 
inexperienced subjects on the first play of the game; ( 4) violations of dominant strate­
gies diminish with repetition and with experience (playing a second sequence of games
with a new group) ; (5) violations of dominant strategies to contribute (ri/1� < 1, Saijo
and Yamaguchi (1992] ) appear to be even more prevalent than violations of dominant 
strategies to free ride. 
3 Our Design and Procedures
Our experiment looks at the above findings more closely by studying evironments with 
both non-degenerate distributions of ri/V, and with private information. These innova­
tions are introduced to overcome the limititations of past designs, limitations suggested 
by the thought experiment . The innovations permit us to measure responsiveness to 
ri/V, via response or bidding functions, at both the individual level and the aggregate 
level , and to measure a baseline of deviant or erroneous behavior due to nuisance factors, 
such as boredom or confusion. 
There are a number of specific features of our design that enable us to address other 
issues that are relevant to understanding other commonly observed patterns of behavior . 
These features are listed below. A sample copy of the instructions is in the Appendix. 
1. In all our environments ,  subjects receive ri's that are randomly assigned according
to a uniform distribution between 1 and 20. We sometimes refer to these as token
values. Each time a subject is to make a new decision, he is independently and
randomly assigned a new ri for that decision. Subjects do not know the other
subjects' assignments of rj 's, but the distribution is publicly announced at the
beginning. The value of V is also announced at the beginning.
Therefore, the data contain multiple observations of the choice behavior of each
individual, observations at different levels of ri/V, and permits the estimation of
response functions at both the individual and aggregate levels .
2 .  Y./e vary the distribution of marginal rates of substi tution, (ri/V) , by shifting V.
We look at the four different distributions given by V E {3, 6, 10, 1 5}. One of the
distributions, V = 3, has the feature that group efficiency is not maximized when all 
subjects contribute in every round. In that condition, on average, forty percent of 
the time subjects are assigned a token value that is worth more than four times the 
individual marginal value of the public good. In these cases, contribution reduces 
group efficiency . 
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3. We vary the endowment . In one condition, everyone is endowed with one indivisible
unit of the private good. In the other condition everyone is endowed with nine
discrete uni ts.
4. Each subject makes a sequence of ten decisions in a fixed group with three other
players. This allows a direct comparison to some past experiments, notably those
reported in the Isaac and Walker studies.
5. Each subject participates in a total of four sequences, each time with a different
group of subjects .  The first two sequences have the same parameters; the last two
sequences have the same parameters (but different from the first two). This allows
us to identify experience effects .  All four sequences occur in a single session that
lasts approximately 1 � hours. Each session includes sixteen subjects.
6. All sessions were conducted at the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics
and Political Science, using a collection of PC's that are linked together in a net­
work.
7. Each subject was paid ca.sh, based on a session-specific exchange rate, for ea.ch
point they earned in the session. The exchange rate was picked so that the sum of
equilibrium payoffs was approximately the same across sessions.
[Table 1 here) 
4 Response Functions and Background Noise
We focus mainly on two aspects of the data. The first has to do with attempting to 
identify what we call errors or background noise-behavior that is grossly inconsistent 
with standard theory. Second, we attempt to measure response functions, which a.re the 
analog to bidding functions in auctions. The functions answer the question: How do 
contribution decisions depend on the marginal rate of substitution? '�Te measure errors 
and response functions at both the aggregate and individual levels, using nonparametric 
and parametric models of the error structure. 
It is useful to think of our analysis in the context of a random utility model, of the 
sort found in Madda.la. ( 1983), McFadden (1982), and elswhere, for the analysis of data 
with limited dependent variables. For example, in the condition where subjects have a 
single indivisible unit of the priva.te good, they face a simple binary decision. Vve model
the statistical structure of residua.ls by assuming that utility functions have a random 
component that is not observed. For lack of a better name, we call this the altruism (or 
warm glow) term. Depending upon the value of the altruism term, subjects may receive 
some additional utility from contributing a unit of their endowment, over and above the 
utility induced by the payment method used in the experiment. 
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Theoretically, a.n optima.I response function for an individual with an additive wa.rm 
glow term, Ci, is to contribute xi if ri/V < 1 +Ci, a.nd to contribute 0 if ri/V > 1 + cj .
Any behavior is  optima.I when ri/V = 1 + cj. This is  wha.t we call a cutpoint strategy 
(Palfrey and Rosenthal [ 1988]) . In fact , this optimal strategy is  a one-shot dominant 
strategy for a.ny values of cj, ri, v, and xi.
If the value of ci is stochastic, and varies according to some assumed distribution, an 
estimated response function gives the probability of contribution as a function of other 
controlled variables, such as experience, etc. In addition , the response function gives 
us indirectly an estimate of "background noise." We look at the effect of the following 
variables on response functions: 
• The induced marginal rate of substitution (ri/V).
• Experience.
• Endowment (divisible or indivisible - i .e .  one or nine units) .
• The va.lue of the public good (V).
• Repetition (Is there a deca.y over the ten rounds of play?) .
5 Analysis of the data
5.1 Some baselines 
We present three different baseline error rates. This gives a. rough calibration of a lower 
bound on the amount of background noise3 in the experiment . By this ,  we mean the
percent of observed decisions that appear incongruous with nearly any currently accepted 
theory of rational decisionmaking. Vve also make an attempt to compare our baseline
with baselines observed elsewhere, to the extent possible. 
5.1.1 Splitting 
By splitting, we mean that a subject contributes some fraction of his endowment ,  but not 
all of it .  Because of the linear structure of the environment, such behavior is  not rational 
even if a subject has a warm glow term added to his marginal rate of substitution. While 
it might be possible to think up models where such behavior is rational , such explanations 
would likely be quite contrived. Tables 2, 3, a.nd 4 present the splitting data from our 
experiments. Recall tha.t in half of our experiments ,  subjects were not capable of splitting, 
since they had only a binary choice. Thus, the data in this table is based on only half 
the sample. One can see two striking features. First , splitting is more prominent among 
3Contemporaneous work by Andreoni (1992) is also pursuing this issue.
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inexperienced subjects and in the early periods of ea.ch 10-period game. Second ,  splitting 
almost never occurs when subjects have ri/V < 1. In other words, almost all splitting
can be accounted for by subjects who have a. dominant strategy to free ride. 
[Table 2, Table 3 ,  and Table 4 here] 
These findings contrast sharply with those of Issac and 'Va.Iker. They observe splitting 
well over half of the time in their data. and, for their marginal rate of substitution, or 
MRS, of 1 .33 experiments ,  there is very li ttle decay of splitting over the course of the ten 
periods. 
[Table 5 here] 
5.1.2 Spiteful behavior 
Many have speculated that subjects violate their dominant strategy to free ride because 
of some form of altruism, or alternatively, because their utility function depends on group 
payoffs in a. positive way. If this is the ma.in driving force behind the past findings , then
we should see very little free r iding when subjects have rifV < 1 .  Based on this scenario,
violations of dominant strategies to contribute can reasonably be attributed to effectively 
random behavior. This gives us a second kind of baseline error rate. In our experiments ,  
four percent of the decisions violate the dominant strategy to  contribute when rifV < 1 .
This number i s  remarkably stable a.cross periods and a.cross the experience treatment 
(see Table 6) .  
[Table 6 here] 
5.1.3 Sacrificial behavior 
In one of our designs, V = 3, the group optimum is not obtained by everyone contributing 
for every possible ri they might draw. In particular , the group payoff is maximized if 
subjects contribute if and only if ri::::; 411=12. A subject who contributes when ri > 12
sacrifices more than the entire group benefits .  It is ha.rd to imagine any except the most 
fervent altruists contributing under these ci rcumstances. The frequency of this type of 
contribution also provides , in a slightly different way, a lower bound on the amount of 
"crazy" or random behavior. As Table 7 shows, this kind of behavior is approximately 
as common as spiteful behavior, but virtually disappears with experience (1 observation 
out of 129) . 
[Table 7 here] 
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5.2 Estimation of response functions from aggregate data 
5.2.1 A Simple Model 
We measure response functions as the probability of contribution as a function of the 
marginal rate of substitution or MRS. First, consider the fol lowing family of theories , a 
family that includes both the dominant strategy (game) theory and the altruism theories 
based on an additive warm glow altruism term. Each member of this family is character­
ized by an error rate, £ ,  and a threshold, Jl1. An (c, M) theory states that "Individuals
contribute to a public good if and only if the marginal rate of substitution (token value 
divided by public good value plus warm glow) is less than or equal to 111. However, they 
make errors at a rate of c." 
If 111 = 1, then this is just the dominant strategy theory, modified appropriately to 
account for the possibility of error. If Jl1 > 1 this indicates some degree of altruism,
everyone is altruistic. If JI![ < 1, this indicates negative altruism. According to our data,
what is the best theory in this family? Using the criterion of maximum likelihood ,  the 
answer is the 111* that produces the fewest classification errors in the data, together with 
c* equal to whatever the classification error generated by JI![* is. This is not only easy 
to calculate, it is also easy to illustrate graphically. Figure 1 displays the answer: In our
data, the best theory is 111=1.1. It results in only 12.5 percent (c*) classification errors
and is very close to the selfish cutpoint equal to 1 .0 .  Figures 2 and 3 break this analysis 
down across the various levels of the V-treatment and the two levels of the endowment 
treatment . 
5.2.2 Probit Analysis 
An alternative, more familiar way to estimate response functions is by Probit analysis .  In 
effect, the Pro bit analysis fits curves through the raw data shown in Figures 4-7. In this 
analysis ,  we assume that an altruism term, £it, is a Normally distributed random term 
added to an individual's MRS that it is independently distributed across individuals and 
across decisions. 
The impact of experience, endowment and other experimental treatments are easily 
assessed by introducing dummy variables. The simplest probit model , with only a con­
stant term and ri/V, or MRS, entering on the right hand side gives us an estimate of the 
average altruism term, which we denote by€, and its standard deviation 0'£ . 
We consider five Probit Models which are built by recursively adding independent 
variables to the basic model . Note that an observation in these models is a decision 
involving a single token. In order to maintain equal representation between the conditions 
with an endowment of one and those with an endowment of nine, an investment decision 
in the endowment of one conditions is given the same weight as nine similar investment 
decisions in the endowment of nine conditions. 
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The intercept coefficients in a Pro bit model represent changes in € / ac, and the slope 
coefficients represent changes in -1 /a c,. The estimated mean, €, is equal to minus the 
slope coefficient divided by the intercept coefficient . It follows that a negative change 
in the already negative slope coefficient leads to a decrease in 6, holding everything else
constant. This decrease is implied by the decrease in variance due to the more negative 
slope coefficient .  If everything is to stay the same, € must also decrease. The decrease in
variance also makes the slope of the curve steeper. 
From each Pro bit Model, we can obtain a response function P(· ), which returns the
probability that a subject invests in the public good.  The six variables in the other 
models are: exper.s, a slope dummy for subjects with experience; exper, a constant 
dummy for subjects with experience; endow.s, a slope dummy for treatments with an 
endowment of nine; endow, a. constant dummy for subjects with an endowment of nine; 
11, the marginal return from the public good; and period which ranges from 1 to 10.
Coefficients, t-sta.tistics, log likelihoods, and the percentages correctly predicted for ea.ch 
model are given in Table 8. 
[Table 8 here) 
Turning to specific models, even the simple model P1, in which a player's invest­
ment decision depends only upon MRS, is able to correctly predict 83.064 percent of the 
observations. 
In model P2, the slope coefficient for the experience variable, ea:per.s, is negative 
which means the response curve for experienced subjects is steeper than the response 
curve for inexperienced subjects. The coefficient for the intercept variable for experience, 
exper, is positive. This tends to offset the change in € implied by the reduced variance, 
however, the total change in€ is still negative. 
A player's cutpoint is the point at which he i s  indifferent between investing in the 
public good and investing in the private good, the point where Pi = 1/2. For inex­
perienced subjects, the estimated cutpoint is 1 .641, and for experienced subjects, it i s  
1.399. This finding reinforces the findings of Isaac and vValker. Experienced subjects a.re 
more consistent with the dominant strategy model than inexperienced subjects. In this 
case, the effect is even significant . Of independent interest is that experienced subjects' 
response functions are steeper, indicating less random behavior. 
Pro bit model P3, shows a. minor effect of the addition of a. pair of endowment variables, 
both equal 1 if the endowment is nine tokens and 0 if the endowment is one token. In this 
case, the slope shift is positive and the intercept shift is negative. The consequence is that 
the response function for subjects in the high endowment condition is flatter than the 
response function for subjects in the low endowment condition. The negative intercept 
is enough to counteract the higher variance, however, and the high endowment means 
are less than the low endowment means. The magnitudes of these coefficients a.re much 
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smaller than those associated with the experience effect and the effect of the endowment 
change is similarly smaller .4 The actual differences are shown in Figure 8 .  
The variable V, which i s  added in model 'P4, measures the marginal valuation of the 
public good.  One interpretation (since we have controlled for MRS) is that its coefficient 
tells us what happens to a subject 's behavior as the payoffs rise. Although the effect is 
very small ,  we find that a player's response function becomes steeper, and the average 
deviation becomes smaller . A similarly small result holds when the period of the decision 
is taken into account . Holding everything else constant, a player is less likely to contribute 
in later periods than in earlier periods. 
Quite clearly, the major effects a.re clue to MRS and experience. While the endowment 
condition has some effect , it is not as important. The effects clue to the size of the payoffs 
and to the period of the decision pale in  comparison. 
5.3 Response Functions and Errors: Individual Level Analysis 
The analysis in the previous section assumes that individuals are identical .  In fact , 
there a.re indications of heterogeneity in our data. S imilar indications have also been 
noted in pa.st work. This section offers a simple approach to look at differences between 
individuals ,  based on minimization of classification errors (as in section 5.2.1) . We do 
two things . First , we break clown that analysis by individual, and obtain a distribution of 
classification minimizing cutpoints for individuals . This allows us to identify the fraction 
of subjects who behave consistently with the Nash equilibrium, subjects we call Nash 
players. Second, from these estimated individual cutpoints , we can obtain a distribution 
of the error rates across individuals .  This gives us a way to identify what fraction of 
subjects are behaving consistently with some cutpoint model. 
Y../e define a Nash Player as a player who is rational and non-altruistic .  5 That is
6i = 0. With this in mind, consider Tables 7 and 8 which report, by subject, the raw 
number of classification errors for each of the twenty possible cutpoints. These cutpoints 
correspond to the possible token values. They are the only applicable cutpoints, because 
they relate directly to every possible realization of Ti. 
[Tables 7 and 8 here] 
Each possible cutpoint is given a score based on how well it represents that subject 's 
decisions in the experiment . The score is simply the number of times a violation would 
4The magnitudes are comparable because the variables, both dummies, are of the same scale, namely 
0 or 1. 
5Because our estimation allows for errors, a Nash Player may be different than a player who perfectly 
follows the decision rule implied by the self-interested model. The difference is that a Nash Player is 
allowed to make mistakes. 
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have occurred if that was the actual cutpoint rule the subject used.6 More specifically, 
we hypothesize that a particular player is using a cupoint that corresponds to token value
x (we consider every possible x in turn) . Hypothetically, ea.ch time that player receives
a token value ri, he compares it to x and then spends only if ri < x. A classification
error occurs if one of the two following events occurs: ri < x and the player does not
spend, or ri > x and the player does spend. The lower the cutpoint 's score, the better
it represents that person's decisions. In these two tables we report the data from one of 
the { 6, 1} treatments and one of the { 6, 9} treatments. 7 
The first thing to notice is that the minimum error cutpoint is not always unique. 
When forced to estimate a unique cutpoint , we select the one closest to 1 ,  which is 
Na.sh play. In Table 9, subjects {4, 6 , 10, 14, 15, 16} are classified as Nash players , a.s a.re 
subjects {3, 4, 5 ,  6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15} in Table 10. A second thing to notice is that not every 
subject has the same estimated cutpoint . In Table 9, for example, subject #2 has an 
estimated cutpoint of 2.17 (corresponding to a token value of 13) while subject #16 has 
an estimated cutpoint of 1.0 (corresponding to a token value of 6) . Another observation 
is that , for some subjects, the minimum number of errors is strictly greater than zero. 
Pooling across a.11 experiments ,  we find that 144/256, or 56 percent of the observations 
are Nash players. The entire distribution of cutpoints is illustrated in Figure 9. On the 
x-axis is the difference between the estimated cutpoint and the value of the public good 
in token value units .  For example, subject #1 from Table 10 would be included in the 
"3" category in this figure, since his estimated cutpoint is 9 and the value of the public 
good is 6 .  An x-value of 0 in this figure corresponds to Nash play. This figure can also be 
broken down by experience, and doing so illustrates the effect of experience on inducing
Nash (non-altruistic) play. This is shown in Figure 10.
Finally, we define consistent players as players that can be perfectly classified, so that 
they never make a.n error a.t their estimated cutpoint . Pooling a.cross a.11 experiments ,  
we find 178/256, or 70 percent consistent players. The percentages of experienced and 
inexperienced consistent players a.re 75 and 64 respectively. Figure 11 displays the dis­
tribution of error rates , measured as the proportion of an individual's decisions that are 
inconsistent with his estimated cutpoint. Comparing to the earlier baselines, these error 
rates a.re a.gain mostly in a. range of five percent or below. 
5.4 Comparison to Previous Results 
There a.re a. few simple comparisons between our data and the data from four person 
experiments conducted by Isaac and ·walker. Recall that, in Issac and ·walker's experi­
ments, a.11 subjects have identical marginal rates of substitution, equal to either 1 .33 or 
6'i\'hen a particular rule was imprecise, i.e., when the player was indifferent, it was assumed that no
errors were made. 
7These two tables are meant to be representative. 
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3.33 (which they refer to as High MPCR and Low MPCR) .  Their experiments also used 
a ten-period repetition design. 
The most notable difference between their data and ours is in the frequency with 
which we observed consistent Nash pla.y. This occurs when a subject , for an entire ten-­
period repetition, makes no decision that is inconsistent with dominant strategy Nash 
equilibrium. In terms of Figures 9 and 11, these subjects are in the 0-categories in both 
figures . We observe this 118 out of 256 observations ,  or 45 percent of the time. Isaac 
and Walker observe this 7 out of 76 observations ,  or 9 percent of the time. Thus we find 
five times as much consistent Nash play. Large differences also occur in the frequency of 
splitting, as pointed out earlier (Tables 2-5) . 
A second comparison is to look at the decisions made by our subjects when they ha.cl 
MRS = 1 .33 and MRS= 3.33. The comparison is given in Table 11. 
[Table 11 here] 
Again, the same kind of pattern emerges. \Ve find lower contribution rates. In fact , 
our contribution rate for MRS = 3.33 is roughly the same magnitude as the background 
noise measured in our baselines. 
A third comparison is what we call repetition effects and what has been referred to 
elsewhere as decay - it is typical in these experiments to see less contribution in later 
periods than in early periods . In fact , in comparable experiments, contribution rates in 
early periods have ranged from two to four times as much as contribution rates in later 
periods. We measure an effect in our data (recall the Probit analysis) , but we find the 
magnitude of the deca.y to be very small. It is true that there is more free riding in later 
periods, but this is attributable to a decrease in subject errors, or an increase in their 
consistency, not to a change in their decision rule. This fact is also reflected in the decline 
of splitting behavior documented earlier. 
Andreoni (1988) conducted experiments similar to those of Isaac and V\Talker and 
observed magnitudes of contribution, free riding, and decay that by interpolation are 
roughly the same as those found i n  the data. generated by Isaac and \¥alker. Those 
experiments used five person groups and MRS = 2. Instructions were somewhat different 
and some new treatments were explored. Andreoni 's results are similar to those of Issac 
and vValker, and differences between our data and his are likewise similar to the differences 
between our data and Issac and Walker's. 
Our findings also contrast sharply with the highly anomalous behavior in the exper­
iments clone by Saijo and Yamaguchi . They conducted homogeneous preference experi­
ments with MRS= . 7  and MRS= 1.42. Like Andreoni , they observe magnitudes of free 
riding, and decay for their experiments with an MRS = 1.42 that a.re roughly the same 
as those in Isaac and Walker's da.ta.  Saijo and Yamaguchi and Issac and vValker also 
observe similar split rates. The splitting rates observed in both of Saijo and Yamaguchi's 
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treatments are 55 percent. They get as much splitting when subjects have a dominant 
strategy to contribute, as when subjects have a dominant strategy to free ride! Our 
findings are dramatically different . 
Saijo and Yamaguchi observe aggregate contribution rates that a.re different from 
ours and also from Isaac and Walker's. For the 1.42 treatment, they observe 27 percent 
contribution, which is quite a bit less contribution than that seen in Isaac and Walker's 
data  for MRS = 1 .33. Our closest observations to MRS = 1.42 are at MRS = 1.5 and 
MRS = 1.4 .  Vve observed contribution rates of .27 and .36, respectively for those two
values of MRS. 
In their MRS = . 7 treatment , Sa.ijo and Yamaguchi see a contribution rate of 58 per­
cent! Recall that our observed contribution rate was so close to 1 ( .96) for this range 
of MRS , that we used this as one of our baselines for the rate of background noise! We 
have no satisfactory explanation for this enormous difference between their results and 
ours. However, we do note that those experiments were conducted somewhat differently 
in a number of ways, which may partially account for the differences in data .. 
Saijo and Yamaguchi employed seven member groups instead of four member groups ,  
they conducted the experiments manually instead of through a computer network, and 
they used different instruction methods. In fact, they used two instruction sets as a 
treatment, and found significant differences due to tha.t treatment. Also, they required 
subjects to make each decision within 20 seconds, and they used a different subject 
pool . Saijo and Yamaguchi suggest that the differences may be attributable to cultural 
differences between Japan and the U .S .  "'e are skeptical of that explanation, but have 
no better one to offer. 
6 Interpreting the Results
The main differences between our findings and previous findings can be summarized by 
the following observations: 
1. We observe less splitting.
2. We do not observe significant decay.
3 .  Vile observe lower contribution rates.
4. We observe more Na.sh behavior.
5 . Vve observe essentially no spiteful behavior.
The findings that replicate from past experiments with comparable group sizes a.re 
that experience lea.els to lower contribution rates, and contribution rates a.re declining i n
the marginal rate of subst itution (marginal valuation of the private good ) .
13 
Explanations for the differences that we observe are either methodological or envi­
ronmental in nature. Possible methodological explanations abound: we utilize slightly 
different experimental procedures, or our instructions and computer screens are differ­
ent , we employ a different subject pool, etc. On the environmental side, our experiments 
utilize a different economic environment ,  by which we mean the information structure 
and the profile of preferences in the group are different. In particular , as emphasized in 
the introduction, the information structure and profile of preferences correspond almost 
exactly to the standard environment used for auction experiments .  In each period ,  pref­
erences in the group are randomly and independently drawn from a known distribution 
of marginal rates of substitution, thereby inducing heterogeneity across individuals. This 
contrasts sharply with environments that have been explored in earlier investigations of 
the voluntary contributions mechanism. 
To try to assess the relative importance of the methodological and environmental ex­
planations , we have subsequently tried to replicate Issac and Walker's findings using our 
procedures and subject pool and their homogeneous environment . Specifically, we con­
ducted an additional experimental session where every subject had a publicly announced 
marginal rate of substitution equal to 3.33, and every subject was endowed with multiple 
units of the private good. 
F igure 12 compares the results of this session with the data from Issac and Walker. 
There is very little difference. The main features of the data replicate: there are very high 
contribution rates early on, and these rates decay significantly. In this extra session, we 
also observed similar splitting rates and amounts of Na.sh behavior. Based on this data, 
we dismiss the possibility that differences in our experimental procedures or subject pool 
are responsible for the differences in our results .  
Thus we are left only with environmental explanations. This lea.els us  to conclude that 
the findings from earlier experiments ,  experiments that utilized homogeneous environ­
ments , are not robust to public goods environments which exhibit variation in preferences, 
even if we limit attention only to linear public goods environments. This is a significant 
finding, even more so if one suspects ,  as we do, that heterogeneous preferences are a 
factor in most natural settings. There is an interesting question left open, namely "Why 
does heterogeneity lead to such different results?" 
It is possible that , with homogeneous preferences, it is easier for a group to achieve 
a cooperative solution of the sort suggested by repeated game arguments .  For example, 
if subjects adopt the type of strategies that reciprocate generous behavior by others , 
or believe that others adopt these strategies (see Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts ,  and Wilson 
(1985] ) ,  then some of the patterns of behavior that have been noticed in the homogeneous 
preference experiments, decay and pulsing, for example, can be rationalized. 
In our design, since preferences are private information, the ability to signal one's 
generosity to other players is interfered with.8 If one is observed to contribute, other
8 Actually, in most of the homogeneous design experiments, homogeneity is not publicly announced. 
However, experiments by Isaac and Walker (1990) find that common knowledge oft.he homogeneity has 
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subjects cannot tell if you are being generous ,  or simply acting selfishly. 
To identify the effects of the private information in our experiments ,  we conducted 
two revealed-information sessions (with V = 6 and X = 9) where a.11 token value draws 
were revealed to everyone in the group. In the first of these sessions, token values were 
revealed after the decisions were ma.de. In the second, token values were revealed before 
the decisions were ma.de. In both cases, the signal interference problem is eliminated, 
which, if the above explanation is correct , should lead to greater contribution and less 
free riding. 
The pooled results for the revealed information sessions are displayed in Figure 13, 
which compares the empirical response function with the data. from all the other het­
erogeneous preference experiments (those with no revealed information).9 There is very 
little difference. In fact, if anything, revealed information seems to lead to even more 
free riding behavior, which is contrary to the reputation hypothesis . 
This leaves us without a complete explanation for why we observe such different results 
in our environment . At this point, we simply do not know. A number of other possible 
explanations can be imagined. Perhaps it was important (because of faster learning, less 
boredom, or something else) that subjects in our design a.re assigned a. new MRS for ea.ch 
decision. This sort of explanation unfortunately seems to be currently beyond the reach 
of existing theoretical models of behavior in these kinds of games. On the other hand, 
the findings here a.re suggestive of possible new directions for theoretical work, as well as 
some directions for new experimental designs. 
no effect on behavior. They conjecture that subjects infer from the wording in the instrnctions that 
other subjects have similar payoff tables. 




Sample Instructions from 4/9/92 (read aloud) 
This is an experiment in decision making. You will be paid IN CASH at 
the end of the experiment. The amount of money you earn will depend upon the 
decisions you make and on the decisions other people make. It is important 
that you do not talk at all or otherwise attempt to communicate with the other 
subjects except according to the specific rules of the experiment. If you have 
a question, feel free to raise your hand. One of us will come over to where 
you are sitting and answer your question in private. 
This session you are participating in is broken down into a sequence of 
four separate experiments. Each experiment will last 10 rounds. At the end 
of the last experiment", you will be paid the total amount you have accumulated 
during the course of all 4 experiments. Everyone will be paid in private and
you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings 
are given in FRANCS. At the end of the last experiment, you will be paid 11 
cents for every 100 FRANCS you have accumulated during the course of all 4 
experiments. 
In each experiment you will be divided into 4 groups of 4 persons each.
Those groups will stay the same for all 10 rounds of the experiment. After 
each of 10 round experiment, everyone will be regrouped into 4 entirely new
groups. Therefore, whenever we change groups, the other people in your group 
will be completely different from the last group you were in .. You will not be 
told the identity of the other members in your group. Since we will be running 
4 experiments tonight, you will be assigned 4 different groupings, one for each
10 round experiment. 
RULES FOR EXPERIMENT #l 
Each round of the experiment you will have 9 tokens. You must choose how
many of these tokens you wish to keep and how many tokens you wish to spend. 
The amount of money you earn in a round depends on how many tokens you keep, 
how many tokens you spend, and how many tokens are spent by others in your 
group. Each round, you will be told how many FRANCS each token is worth if 
you keep it. This amount, called your TOKEN VALUE, and will change from round 
to round and will vary from person to person randomly. To be more specific, 
in each round, this amount is equally likely to be anywhere from 1 to 20 
FRANCS. There is absolutely no systematic or intentional pattern to your token 
values or the token values of anyone else. The determination of token values 
across rounds and across people is entirely random. Therefore, everyone in 
your group will generally have different token values. Furthermore, these 
token values will change from round to round in a random way. You will be 
informed PRIVATELY what your new token value is at the beginning of each round 
and you are not permitted to tell anyone what this amount is. 
After being told your token value, you must wait at least 10 seconds 
before making your decision of how many tokens to spend and how many to keep. 
Your keyboard will be frozen for this period of time. When everyone has made 
a decision, you are told how many tokens were spent in your group and what your 
earnings were for that round. 
This will continue for 10 rounds. Following each round you will begin 
with 9 new tokens and you will be randomly assigned a new token value between
1 and 20 FRANCS .
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PAYOFFS 
You will receive 3 FRANCS times the total number of tokens spent in your
group. In addition, you will also receive your token value times the number 
of tokens you keep. Notice that this means every time anyone in your group 
spends a token, everyone in the group (including the spender) gets an 
additional 3 FRANCS, but the spender forgoes his or her token value for that
token. WHAT HAPPENS IN YOUR GROUP HAS NO EFFECT ON THE PAYOFFS TO MEMBERS OF 
THE OTHER GROUPS AND VICE VERSA. Therefore, in each round, you have the 
following possible earnings, as shown in the table: 
[WRITE EARNINGS TABLE ON BOARD] 
Earnings Table for Experiment 1 
YOUR SPENDING DECISION OTHERS YOUR EARNINGS (in FRANCS) 
0 N tokens (N*3) + (9*Your token value) 
1 N tokens 3 + (N*3) + (8*Your token value) 
2 N tokens 6 + (N*3) + (7*your token value) 
3 N tokens 9 + (N*3) + (6*Your token value) 
4 N tokens 12 + (N*3) + (S*Your token value) 
5 N tokens 15 + (N*3) + (4*your token value)
6 N tokens 18 + (N*3) + (3*Your token value) 
7 N tokens 21 + (N*3) + (2*Your token value)
8 N tokens 24 + (N*3) + your token value 
9 N tokens 27 + (N*3) 
Here is an example: 
Suppose everyone else in your group spends 13 tokens in all and you spend 4 
tokens and your token value was 12. You would earn 12 + 39 + 60 = 111 FRANCS.
If you had spent 3 tokens you would have earned 9 + 39 + 72 = 120 FRANCS. If 
you had spent 5 tokens you would have earned 15 + 39 + 48 = 102 FRANCS.
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES: 
Are there any questions? (ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
[Two practice rounds. Tell them not to press any keys unless you tell them to. 
In round 1 have each subject spend the number of tokens equal to the last digit
of their ID#. In round 2 have each subject KEEP the number of tokens equal to
the last digit of their ID#. Go over screen display and history. Tell 
subjects to refrain from pressing keys for no reason. ] 
[Keep screen display on) 
[Hand out quiz. J 
[Correct quiz answers and read them aloud.) 
[Answer any additional questions.) 
[Begin experiment 1.) 
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Specific instructions for Experiment 2: 
Experiment 2 is the same as experiment 1 except you now have been regrouped 
with a completely different set of participants. 
[Begin experiment 2.] 
Specific instructions for Experiment 3: 
Experiment 3 is the same as experiments 1 and 2 except now everyone in a group 
receives 15 FRANCS times the number of spenders in their group. Again, in 
addition, nonspenders also receive their token values. Again, everyone has 
been reassigned to a new group with a new set of participants. Here is your 
new payoff table: 
[CHANGE BOARD . EXPLAIN. ]
Earnings Table for Experiment 3 
YOUR SPENDING DECISION OTHERS YOUR EARNINGS (in FRANCS) 
0 N tokens (N*l5) + (9*Your token value)
1 N tokens 15 + (N*l5) + (8*Your token value)
2 N tokens 30 + (N*l5) + (7*Your token value)
3 N tokens 45 + (N*l5) + (6*Your token value)
4 N tokens 60 + (N*l5) + (5*Your token value)
5 N tokens 75 + (N*l5) + (4*Your token value)
6 N tokens 90 + (N*l5) + (3*Your token value)
7 N token 105 + (N*l5) + (2*Your token value)
8 N tokens 120 + (N*l5) + your token value 
9 N tokens 135 + (N*l5) 
Example: 
Suppose everyone else in your group spends 13 tokens in all and you spend 4 
tokens and your token value was 12. You would earn 60 + 195 + 60 = 315 FRANCS, 
If you had spent 3 tokens you would have earned 45 + 195 + 72 = 312 FRANCS. If 
you had spent 5 tokens you would have earned 75 + 195 + 48 = 318 FRANCS. 
[Begin experiment 3.]
Specific instructions for Experiment 4: 
Experiment 4 is the same as experiment 3 except you have been regrouped again. 
[Begin experiment 4.] 
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Endowmen� 3 6 10 15 
1 token 2 2 2 2 
9 tokens 2 2 2 2 
Table 1 :  Each cell has two 10-period sequences of a cohort with sixteen subjects di­
vided into four groups. The first sequence is called "inexperienced"; the second is called 
"experienced."  Groups were shuffled between sequences . 
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early late 
mexp . .22 .11 
(320) (320) 
exp. .12 .04 
(320) (320) 
Table 2: Analysis of Splits . All data with endowment nine. 
early late 
mexp. .36 .19 
(182) (176) 
exp. .21 .07 
(180) (170) 
Table 3: Analysis of Spli ts. Endowment = 9, MRS > 1 .
early late 
mexp. .029 .021 
(138) (144) 
exp. .021 .0067 
(140) (150) 











Table 5: Splitting behavior in  the IW <la.ta .. 
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early late 
mexp. .03 .04 
(262) (285) 
exp. .04 .04 
(263) (288) 
Table 6: Spiteful behavior. Free-riding rates for subjects with MRS < 1 (Dominant
Strategy to Contribute) 
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early late 
mexp . .08 .04 
(63) (65) 
exp. 0 .002 
(65) (64) 
Table 7: Sacrifica.l Behavior. Contribution Rates for Subjects with MRS > 4
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Probit Models 
1 2 3 4 5 
ones 1 . 778 1.504 1.612 1 .801 1.850 
(85.301) (57.596) (45.538) (34.252) (32.222) 
MRS -1.156 -0.916 -0.973 -1.013 -1.015 
(-86.358) (-58.866) (-44.078) (-42.878) (-42 .896) 
exper.s  -0. 861 -0.858 -0 .867 -0.868 
(-25.252) (-25.084) (-25.235) (-25.233) 
exp er 0.983 0 .980 0.992 0 .994 
(20.013) (19.919) (20 .075) (20.089) 
endow.s 0 .104 0.108 0 .107 
(3. 742) (3 .888) (3 .856) 
endow -0.199 -0.207 -0.205 
(-4.618) (-4 . 761) (-4. 730) 




lg lkhd -8912. 7 -8522. 7 -8511.9 -8499. 7 -8497.4 
% pred. 83 .064 83.160 83 .238 83.429 83.607 
Table 8: In each Probit Model, the dependent variable is the investment decision. Equal 
weight has been given to both the one token treatment and to the nine token treatment . 
Under each coefficient is the asymptotic t-statistic . The log likelihood and the percentage 
correctly predicted are also given for each model. 
Token Value (Cutpo int ) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0  
1 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 4 5 
2 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 
s 3 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 
u 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
b 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 
j 6 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 7 7 7 7 
e 7 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 7 
c 8 4 4 3 3 3 3 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 6 6 
t 9 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 
1 0  3 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 5 5 5 7 7 7 7 
# 1 1  3 3 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 7 7 
1 2  5 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 1 0 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 
13  6 6 5 4 4 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
14 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 
1 5  2 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 6 6 6 6 7 
1 6  3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 
Table 9: The ra.w number of classification errors for the first repetition of treatment 
{6, 1} 
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Token Value (Cutpo int ) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 314 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0  
1 232323 5 5 5 5 5 3 1 0  82424233 13 140585867 
2 2 2 1 5 17 1 7 1 2 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 0234 1 5 0  
s 3 5445452 7 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 82727363636363636363636 
u 4 18 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 2727273645454545 
b 5 18  9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 1 8 1 8 1 82754545454636363 
j 6 1 8 1 8 1 8 18 9 0 0 0 9 18 18363636454563636363 
e 7 3 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 0 1 0222222221 9 24414 14 141 5 9  
c 8 1 1 1 1  2 2 2 2 22029374545454545 5454627979 
t 9 3 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2  9 24241941394653 
1 0  272 7 1 8 1 8  9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 2745454563636363 
# 1 1  1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 14 1 9 1 9 1436454545 5454547272 
12 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 182745454554637272727272 
13  1 9 1 9 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0  93535354444445353535353 
14 44353535262617 9 1 9282 0 2 1 3030293737373746 
15 2 2 2 2 1 3 1 3  4 4 4 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 13203441 5050505059 
1 6  30 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 9 26 2 6 26 2 1 233030283442425 1 5 1  
Table 10 : The raw number of classification errors for  the first repetit ion of treatment 
{6, 9} 
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IW data Our data 
MRS= 1.33 .50 .37 
(240) (90) 
MRS= 3.33 .20 .05 
(520) (56) 
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Fi gme 2 :  C l assifica tion errors aggrega ted over all subjects shown for all treatments
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Rate of I nvestment in  Public Exchange 
v = 3  
Figure 4: The aggregate percentage of tokens invested in the public exchange vs. the 
marginal rate of substitution, plotted for both the endowment of one and the endowment
of n ine conditions. V = 3 
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Rate of I nvestment in Publ ic Exchange 
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Figure 5: The aggregate percentage of tokens i nvested in the public exchange vs. the 
marginal  rate of subst i tution, plotted for both the endowment of one and the endowment 
of n ine cond i t ions .  11 = 6 
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Figure 6 :  The aggregate percentage of tokens invested in the public exchange vs. the 
margi na l  rate of substi tution, plotted for hoth the endowment of one and the endowment 
of n in� conditions .  \I = 1 0  
Rate of I nvestment in  Publ ic Exchange 
v = 1 5  
g> 0.9 







0 �: .0 0.3 e .._ 
0. 0.2 ;p. 
0. 1 +-r--r---.---.---.--...---.,...-,.---.- �-��--.-��---.---.-� .......... ---.- -1 
0.00 0.50 1 .00 1 .50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.50 6.00 6.50 7.00 
MRS 
I - endowment of 1 ...... endowment of 9 
Figure 7: The aggregate percentage of tokens invested in the public exchange vs . the
margi n al rate of substi tut ion ,  plotted for both the endowment of one and the endowment
of ni ne cond i t ion s .  V = 10
Estimated Response Functions 
Probit Model #3
Cl 0.9c: "§ 0.8
Q) ..c::i 0.7 
B.. 0.6 "�� ·� 0.5 \ ti5 \� 0.4 \ � 0.3 \\ 
..c::i 0.2 \ 
§.. 0.1  \,... ..._.._ o+-----.-�����___:;:::.::::,,_,___,.:::::==-._----�--_,..�.,..---i 
0.00 1 .00 2.00 3.00 
MRS 4.00 
5.00 6.00 7.00
I- inexper, 1 · · · · · · ·  exper, 1 - - - ·  inexper, 9 - - - ·  exper, 9 




0 . 8 
0. 7







I nd ividual Cutpoints 
Al l Data
F re qu e n cy ( ou t  o f  2 56 o bs e r vat i o n s )
-3 -2  - 1  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cu t po i n t (dev i at i on f rom N as h )
- Al l  data
8 +
Cl a s s i f i c a t i o n  m i n i m i z i n g c u t p o l n t s
1 
0 . 9  
0 . 8  
0 . 7  
0 . 6  
0 .5  
0 .4  
0 . 3 
0 . 2  
0 .  1 
0 
Figure 9 :  Estimated cutpoints measured as deviation from Nash play (in token value
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Figure 1 3 .  Empirical response fu n  c t  ion with (reveal) and without (no reveal )  publicly
reported token values. 
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